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DOES DECENTRALIZATION REDUCE CORRUPTION? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM ZIMBABWE'S LOCAL AUTHORITIES**Joseph Tinarwo^{1*}, Tawanda Nyikadzino²**^{1*} *Department of Financial Governance, University of South Africa, South Africa*² *Department of Auditing, University of South Africa, South Africa*E-mails: ^{1*} tinarij@unisa.ac.za (Corresponding author); ² tawanyika@gmail.com

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Abstract. Recently, there has been a renewed global effort to combat corruption to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Corruption across all tiers of government stifles economic growth, undermines national development, and ultimately threatens socio-economic transformation. Devolution has been widely acknowledged as a contemporary governance system that promotes public participation, strengthens transparency and accountability, and democratizes government systems. This study primarily used a qualitative approach to examine the prospects of devolution in addressing corruption in local authorities in Zimbabwe. To achieve this, the study seeks to answer the following questions: To what extent does the implementation of devolution in Zimbabwe contribute to reducing corruption within local authorities? What are the problems the Zimbabwean government faces in utilizing devolution to combat corruption in local authorities? What anti-corruption strategies can the Zimbabwean government utilize to enhance transparency, accountability, and integrity, thereby mitigating corrupt practices through devolution? Data were primarily collected through a triangulation of documentary searches and in-depth interviews, which allowed for the purposive sampling of key informants, including senior administrative officials and councillors in local authorities, senior central government officials in government ministries and departments, development partners, civil society organizations, and academics. The study established that, if adequately implemented, devolution could help reverse the discretionary abuse of public power and resources by central government elites. Findings also indicate that devolution enhances the efficiency of social service provision by enabling a match between local people's desires and aspirations and the governance of public institutions. This research has significant implications for designing anti-corruption strategies that devolution can offer to mitigate corruption while highlighting the challenges and opportunities associated with its implementation.

Keywords: corruption; devolution; local authorities

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JEL Classifications: H10, H11, H12**Additional disciplines:** public administration**1. Introduction**

A renewed global effort has recently been made to combat corruption, ensuring fiscal prudence, achieving developmental targets, and ultimately realizing socio-economic transformation (UNDP, 2021). Corruption across all tiers of government stifles economic growth, undermines national development, and threatens the realization of several human rights (Moyo, 2021; Nirola et al., 2022; Bojanic, 2023; Zvoushe, 2025).

Devolution has been widely acknowledged as a contemporary governance system that promotes public participation, strengthens transparency and accountability, and democratizes government systems. Recent

scientific evidence has revealed that the implementation of devolution as a system of governance has the potential to reverse the discretionary abuse of public power and resources by central government elites (Ngigi & Busolo, 2019; Choudhury, 2023; Yunan et al., 2023; Jin & Kim, 2024; Yunan, Freyens & Vidyattama, 2025).

It also enhances the efficiency of social service provision by allowing a match between the desires and aspirations of the local people and the governance of public institutions. The internationally recognized Corruption Perception Index (CPI), conducted by Transparency International, ranks Zimbabwe 158 out of 180 countries and scores 21 on a 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly clean) scale in 2024, indicating that corruption is rife in this country, particularly in central and local government authorities (Transparency International, 2025). A range of factors has contributed to corruption in Zimbabwe's local authorities and elsewhere in the world, particularly in Africa. These factors include, but are not limited to, poor governance and its derivatives, such as a lack of transparency and accountability, weak legal and institutional frameworks, a lack of political will, and a failure to adopt a multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder approach to combating corruption (Tinarwo et al., 2019). The government is currently implementing devolution as enshrined in Section 264 of the Constitution, which could provide a window of opportunity to combat corruption at both national and sub-national levels.

Since its independence, the Zimbabwean government has been grappling with corruption at various levels. The government implemented several institutional and legal anti-corruption reforms. In 2013, a new Constitution was promulgated. The 2013 Constitution embraces devolution as a critical reform strategy for enhancing accountability and transparency, cardinal pillars of good governance. One of the significant objectives of devolution provided in section 264(2b) of the Constitution is "to promote democratic, effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government in Zimbabwe as a whole" (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013). Section 266 further regulates the conduct of provincial and local government employees. It emphasizes political neutrality, which is essential in curbing political and administrative corruption. It is hoped that devolving governing powers and responsibilities to local authorities, which are closer to the people, will enhance local democracy, thereby fostering citizen participation, transparency, responsiveness, efficiency, and downward accountability (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013; Nyikadzino & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2020). These sound governance principles are indispensable in the fight against corruption at local government levels. Empowered citizens can raise governance questions and hold duty-bearers accountable for their actions. To strengthen accountability, the 2013 Constitution further provides for public administration principles and establishes an anti-corruption institution, similar to the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission.

However, notwithstanding the adoption of devolution and other complementary anti-corruption reforms, corruption and related corporate governance scandals persist in Zimbabwe's local authorities. As the Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa argues, "corruption and maladministration are undeniably among the greatest challenges affecting the performance of local authorities in Zimbabwe" (Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa, 2021). The Auditor General's Reports on Local Authorities from 2013 to 2019 highlight several corruption cases in urban councils. Corruption in urban councils has reached shocking and alarming levels (Majome, 2019; Midlandsnews, 2021). It has significantly compromised the enjoyment of fundamental human rights, including the rights to water, health, and education, among others.

Against the preceding background, this article critically analyses the prospects of devolution in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe's local authorities. It assesses the opportunities and challenges to curbing corruption through devolution and provides policy recommendations to strengthen the anti-corruption drive in Zimbabwe's local authorities. The article makes a case that the effective implementation of devolution could help in addressing the deleterious effects of corruption in Zimbabwe's local authorities by promoting local-level accountability, increasing transparency in the use of public resources, and promoting the participation of local people in decision-making on matters that affect their lives (Chigwata & de Visser, 2020). In addition, fighting corruption in local authorities promotes a democratic dispensation, supports good governance, and ultimately results in a situation in

which every person's right to access services is realised, as provided in several sections of the country's Constitution (Tinarwo et al., 2019).

Main Research Questions: What are the factors/variables influencing corruption in Zimbabwe's local authorities?

- a) What anti-corruption strategies have been implemented by the local authorities in Zimbabwe?
- b) What are the opportunities and challenges in tackling corruption through devolution in Zimbabwe's local authorities?
- c) What policy measures should be taken or adopted to fight corruption in Zimbabwe's local authorities?

2. Review of Literature

2.1. Devolution and Corruption in Local Governance Contexts

Public sector management reformers have criticized centralized government systems for perpetuating corruption and other administrative inefficiencies for nearly four decades (Siburian, 2024). The administrative inefficiencies inherent in centralized government systems worldwide have prompted the implementation of devolutionary reforms, with an emphasis on reducing central government omnipresence, which is often blamed for entrenching rampant and systemic corruption (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008; Nyikadzino & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2020). Subsequently, much of Africa's development and governance debate tends to focus on how devolutionary reforms can curb corruption. In many African countries, devolution has become a strategic reform policy for restructuring governmental systems and fighting corruption (Odigbo, 2013; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004). However, before discussing the relationship between devolution and corruption in local governance, it is essential to conceptualize these two. This is crucial, given that in Zimbabwe, devolution is conceptualized differently and sometimes confused with deconcentration and decentralization.

There are many definitions of devolution, but it broadly involves the “transfer of political power and resources from the central government to democratically elected (and largely independent) subnational units” (Kanyinga, 2016). Similarly, decentralization specialists, such as Cheema & Rondinelli (2007), have long maintained that devolution also transfers revenue-raising powers to democratically elected subnational governments, empowering them to fulfill devolved development and governance functions. Unlike deconcentration, which merely transfers “authority to sub-national branches of the central state, often to line ministry officials based in local areas” (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008), devolution, also sometimes referred to as democratic decentralization, transfers political, decision-making, fiscal and administrative powers, authority and resources to sub-national governments that are both democratically elected and relatively independent of the central government (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008). Devolution is, therefore, a comprehensive and most potent form of decentralization. The central government cedes local control over financial, administrative, political, and decision-making matters through a process of devolution. As Kanyinga (2016) illustrates, it “*gives the citizens and their elected officials the power to make decisions on public affairs. In this regard, devolution enhances democracy and self-governance by giving people a voice in making decisions regarding public policies that concern them*”.

The proponents of devolution argue that devolutionary reforms strengthen local democracy, citizen participation, transparency, accountability, responsiveness, efficiency, and effectiveness, among other cardinal pillars of good local governance. Corruption is a global governance problem that many countries are grappling with. Notwithstanding that corruption has existed for ages and is a commonly used concept, there is no definitional consensus in the literature. Corruption, similar to devolution, has been defined and interpreted differently. Corruption refers to the misuse of entrusted power and public office for personal gain (Duri, 2021, p. 4). Corruption involves the well-calculated violation of the arm's length principle for personal benefit. The arm's length principle applied to local governance emphasizes the centrality of objectivity and neutrality in local decision-making processes. Once personal relationships and political considerations influence local government decisions, conflict of interest, nepotism, and elite and state capture, among other unethical practices, find fertile

ground. Such unethical practices jeopardize the efficient and effective functioning of public organizations. Corruption can have a profoundly devastating impact on the availability, quality, and accessibility of human rights-related goods and services, thereby undermining the rule of law and the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions and processes (Tinarwo et al., 2019). The centralization of power has often been associated with corrupt practices, such as patronage and rent-seeking behavior. Therefore, hopes are high that the implementation of devolution could strengthen transparency and accountability and improve public service delivery at the local level, where citizens have the right and voice in determining the allocation of national resources. For instance, section 13(2) of the Zimbabwean Constitution stipulates that measures for national development must involve the people in formulating and implementing development plans and programmes that affect them (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013). The participation of local people in matters that affect them has positive ramifications for the protection, promotion, fulfillment, and respect of several human rights enshrined in the Constitution (Crawford, 2007). Thus, devolution can be viewed as a more people-centred, just and democratic system of governance that promotes transparency, accountability in the use of public resources, and public participation in development processes (D'Arcy & Cornell, 2016).

2.2. Devolution and Corruption Management at the International Level

Experiences across the globe have yielded mixed results regarding the relationship between devolution and corruption management at local government levels. As Duri (2021) avers, "the effect of devolution on corruption is ambiguous." One of the central arguments that devolutionary advocates advance is that devolution brings governments closer to the people, increases transparency and accountability, and, in the process, reduces corruption (Crawford, 2007). Since the 1980s, devolution has been theoretically linked with establishing and strengthening downward accountability strategies, which could enable local people to demand accountability from political and administrative duty-bearers (Wallis & Oates, 1988; Zarychta et al., 2024). Through devolution, the electorate, if actively involved in local governance issues, can closely monitor the activities and behaviors of local bureaucrats and politicians, thereby minimizing the chances of corrupt dealings (Dawson et al., 2025). In support of this argument, D'Arcy and Cornell (2016) argue that devolution empowers voters to hold corrupt and incompetent local officials accountable. Thus, devolution accompanied by meaningful local democracy is a disincentive for local government officials to engage in unethical conduct.

Several empirical studies show a positive relationship between devolution and corruption. Lederman et al. (2005) and Freille et al. (2007) have demonstrated that devolutionary reforms curb corruption. Based on a panel dataset for industrialized and emerging countries, Lederman et al. (2005) found that central government political, fiscal, and administrative transfers to subnational governments decreased the number of corruption cases. Freille et al. (2007) examined the impact of budgetary decentralization and constitutional provisions for decentralization on corruption, utilizing data from 177 countries. Their study, however, revealed conflicting results on the relationship between devolution and corruption. On the one hand, their study showed that fiscal decentralization lowers corruption tendencies. On the other hand, devolution has increased corruption in cases where governmental tiers overlap, functions are duplicated, and accountability lines are blurred. However, in the preceding case, it would be unfair to blame devolution for poor results. The case, however, provides important insights into the design of devolution. Clarity of roles and functions is crucial for the effective functioning of devolution. Lessmann and Markwardt's cross-country data analysis on the effect of devolution on corruption also emphasized the centrality of the context in implementing devolution reforms (Lessmann & Markwardt, 2010). Their study revealed that devolution reduces corruption in countries with high levels of media freedom. It also highlighted that devolution suffers in countries with fragile monitoring mechanisms.

De Mello and Barenstein (2014) confirm that devolution correlates with low levels of corruption. Using a dataset of 78 countries, De Mello and Barenstein (2014) examined the performance of fiscal decentralization in subnational governments and found that higher fiscal decentralization results in lower corruption. Ivanyina and Shah's (2011) study further advances the devolution-reduces-corruption thesis. Through a sample of 182 countries

and using both reported and perceived corruption cases, they found that a high degree of devolution correlates with reduced corruption levels (Ibid).

Literature shows that, in some instances, the implementation of devolution does not necessarily translate into improved accountability and anti-corruption initiatives. Instead, devolving governmental powers and responsibilities to subnational governments tends to deepen corruption (Duri, 2021). As Nyikadzino and Vyas-Doogapersad (2020) point out, devolution does not guarantee accountability. If not adequately supported, governments can devolve into corruption and inefficiency. An empirical study by D'Arcy and Cornell (2016) revealed that the implementation of devolution in Kenya has not eliminated corrupt and unethical practices, but instead transferred them to the local levels. Their findings highlighted that devolution has been achieved via the devolution of patronage networks, resulting in the persistence of the "our turn to eat" nature of ethnic patronage politics. Resultantly, devolution further marginalized ethnic minorities in some countries.

Reports by Tödtling et al. (2018) and Ngigi and Busolo (2019) show that the transfer of power, fiscal and administrative powers, and resources to the local levels has opened opportunities for corruption due to the active role of subnational governments in employment, contracting, service delivery, and the execution of development programmes. In addition, local governments, given their size, "are more corruptible and easier to capture as only a small segment of the government needs to be influenced" (Duri, 2021). Several empirical studies indicate the likelihood of captured and more corrupt devolved government systems (Ibid; Nyikadzino & Vyas-Doogapersad, 2020). A large-scale study involving data from 36 countries revealed limited evidence showing that devolution improves local accountability (Kolstad, Somville, and Wiig, 2014). Their study found that devolution increases interactions between government officials and residents, thereby increasing the incidence of corruption (Ibid).

3. Methodology

The study employs a qualitative research approach to understand the experiences of stakeholders regarding the potential of devolution in addressing corruption in local authorities in Zimbabwe. A case study research design provided the roadmap for the study. Adopting a qualitative case study design is motivated by the fact that it facilitates the exploration and understanding of the meanings that people attribute to a social phenomenon or the dynamics surrounding corruption (Neuman, 2014). This helps explore the meanings ascribed to and perceptions of people regarding corruption and how devolution can help curb it. Thus, the interaction between the researchers and key participants involved in the implementation of devolution enabled the researchers to understand the reality from the research participants' point of view.

The data was mainly collected through a triangulation of documentary searches and in-depth interviews. Purposive sampling was used to select a sample of 15 to 20 key informants comprising senior administrative officials and councillors in local authorities, senior central government officials in ministries and departments, including members of the Devolution Taskforce, civil society organizations, development partners, and academia. The collected data were analyzed and organized thematically. Ethical principles guided the study, in line with the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (RWI)'s ethical guidelines, which include respect for gender, informed consent, avoidance of harm, voluntary participation, confidentiality, anonymity, and the secure storage of collected data. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, most interviews were conducted virtually for those with internet access. For those without access, interviews were conducted via telephone or through face-to-face meetings, all while adhering strictly to COVID-19 guidelines. For instance, researchers always used face masks and sanitizers and applied social distancing.

4. Major Findings

Findings from both documentary searches and in-depth interviews highlighted that capacitated and empowered sub-national tiers of government have the potential to combat systemic and widespread corruption, as locally controlled systems of government allow the actions and decisions of those in power to be scrutinized by their people. Encouraging the public to participate in local government affairs meaningfully promotes downward accountability, a key tenet of good governance. Participant 1 noted the following: *Devolved government units allow for some checks and balances on how central government officials utilize public resources as they implement public policies. This enables public resources to effectively target the welfare of society's most vulnerable groups and prevent the diversion of public resources for personal gain by self-serving government officials.*

Based on the interviews, it appears that development partners have demonstrated that devolution is a better governance approach that can assist the public, including grassroots citizens, in gaining increased access to leadership authorities. Devolution also enhances the implementation of anti-corruption controls by enabling citizens to participate in local government affairs. Participant 2 noted the following: *Relinquishing power and authority to manage subnational levels of government helps build an environment that engages grassroots stakeholders in the governance process, as it offers them opportunities to contribute to mitigating corruption.*

However, even though Zimbabwe has been implementing devolution for the past years, the findings from both documentary searches and in-depth interviews revealed that corruption is still rife in both the central and sub-national tiers of government. For instance, both the 2019 and the 2021 Auditor General's Reports on Local Authorities on the COVID-19 Pandemic Financial Management and Utilisation of Public Resources in Zimbabwe show that corruption is endemic in local authorities and is characterized by lack of good governance with key features such as the absence of policies, non-compliance with statutory procedures, inadequate record keeping, poor and non-financial reporting among others, all resulting in the diversion of public resources for personal use.

While Zimbabwe has made several international, regional, and domestic commitments to combat corruption, documentary searches have highlighted that these legal frameworks lack alignment and harmonization with the current Constitution and other domestic statutory instruments and procedures. Additionally, these policy instruments lack full implementation and enforcement because the country is still considered one of the most corrupt nations in the world and the region, losing approximately USD 3 billion annually in illicit financial flows.

Moreover, although Zimbabwe has established several institutions to fight corruption, they are characterized by poor coordination, duplication of tasks and responsibilities, and a lack of the requisite institutional and human resource capacity to discharge their duties. The governance deficiencies in Zimbabwe's formal anti-corruption value chain are also worsened by a lack of adequate budgetary support from the treasury, which stifles their efforts to effectively address the scourge of corruption, particularly at the local government level. Participant 3, who is an academic, noted the following: *Key anti-corruption institutions, such as the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the Zimbabwean Parliament, and the Auditor General, lack adequate financial, material, and human resources to carry out their duties effectively. The worsening macroeconomic conditions affecting the country have led to an excessive brain drain from these government institutions, with experienced and skilled personnel leaving their posts in search of more lucrative opportunities.*

In-depth interviews with civil society organizations revealed that devolved units of the government often lack effective anti-corruption strategies to combat corruption at the subnational level. The legal and institutional frameworks, as well as the necessary methods and tools, to prevent, detect, and punish corruption are often weak and insufficient. While the Zimbabwean government has made efforts to establish anti-corruption courts at the provincial level to address corruption cases at the subnational level, these courts are often hindered due to a lack of adequate human and financial resources. ZACC, which has the responsibility to investigate corruption, has been centralized since its establishment until late this year, when it established itself at sub-national levels, implying that it was difficult to effectively fight corruption that occurs at decentralized levels of government.

Additionally, ZACC also lacks the prosecuting powers, which are the responsibility of the National Prosecution Authority (NPA). The lack of harmonization, fragmentation, and duplication of roles in institutions and laws at national and sub-national levels also stifles efforts to combat corruption in local authorities. Like other government institutions, ZACC lacks the necessary material and financial resources, as well as skilled personnel, to effectively combat corruption in Zimbabwe.

The study also established that, for the year 2018, only three out of 92 local authorities in Zimbabwe were able to produce audited financial statements, despite increasing calls for transparency and accountability regarding how both local and central government authorities use public resources. Local authorities in Zimbabwe are facing significant governance challenges, including 59 governance issues, such as the absence of policies and procedures manuals and non-compliance with statutory regulations, among others. Participant 4 noted the following: *Our local authorities are strapped with multiple governance deficiencies. For instance, most are not conducting financial auditing and reporting, or may face capacity-related challenges in doing so. Most of the local authorities in Zimbabwe lack established transparency and accountability mechanisms. As in many countries, these governance measures are typically implemented at the national level, rather than at subnational levels of government.*

Ultimately, the research revealed that local authorities in Zimbabwe lack the necessary practices and strategies to engage citizens meaningfully and promote public participation in managing local government affairs. This contrasts with the principles of good governance and democracy, which call for the involvement of the general public in decision-making and for pressuring authorities to demonstrate transparency and accountability in the use of public resources. Participant 5 noted the following: *Most grassroots individuals are unaware of the importance of their constitutional right to participate in decision-making on matters of government. Civil society organizations must continuously advocate and lobby for the meaningful engagement of citizens in both central and local government business to promote transparency and accountability.*

5. Conceptual Framework for Implementing Devolution to Reduce Corruption in Zimbabwe's Local Authorities

Based on the results of this study, the authors propose the following conceptual framework (See Figure 1 below) for implementing devolution to reduce corruption in Zimbabwe's local authorities. To reduce corruption in Zimbabwe's local authorities through the implementation of devolution, it is crucial to promote downward accountability by fostering a culture of integrity through bottom-up approaches.




Figure 1. Proposed conceptual framework to reduce corruption through the implementation of devolution in Zimbabwe's local authorities

Source: the authors

Furthermore, building strong and resilient legal and institutional frameworks to combat corruption at both national and subnational levels is crucial.

6. Discussion

To reduce corruption in Zimbabwe's local authorities through the implementation of devolution, local authorities must adopt a bottom-up anti-corruption strategy and gain the buy-in of regional political leaders and grassroots citizens. This is mainly because they have the potential to lobby and advocate for the enactment of anti-corruption policies at sub-national levels of government. The most successful governments globally consistently and continuously promote a culture of upholding anti-corruption principles at both central and local government levels. Likewise, subnational governments that demand a culture of transparency and downward accountability to their central government officials earn high standards of integrity.

The legal and institutional frameworks that guide the fight against corruption at the central and local government levels must be strengthened to combat the scourge of corruption. The anti-corruption legislative frameworks in Zimbabwe are highly fragmented and lack alignment with the Constitution of Zimbabwe. Similarly, the key institutions for fighting corruption in Zimbabwe are poorly coordinated, lacking harmonization, and are characterized by the duplication of roles and responsibilities. Additionally, there is a need for adequate budgetary support, the provision of material resources, and the attraction and retention of skilled human resources in all anti-corruption institutions at both local and central government levels. Finally, national government support is also essential in enforcing anti-corruption measures at sub-national levels of government.

This study reveals that most local authorities in Zimbabwe face challenges with poor financial management. Implementing adequate regulatory and financial control policies and procedures is crucial to mitigate the risk of abuse and diversion of public resources for personal use, which can occur through various means, including discretionary spending, license and permit issuance, and procurement processes. Equally, local authorities need to be given adequate investigative and enforcement powers in cases of abuse of public resources by officials or the public to ensure a more effective and transparent decree, as well as integrity. Lastly, there is a need for an effective whistle-blower policy that will protect citizens and other stakeholders while preserving anonymity when reporting corruption at both local and national levels of government.

For devolution to effectively address corruption in local authorities, citizens must be meaningfully involved in decision-making and other forums that promote transparency and accountability in the use of public resources. For instance, citizen engagement forums such as regularly convened meetings, assemblies, and hearings can empower citizens and give them a voice against corrupt public officials. Citizen participation in these forums helps shape anti-corruption policies and strategies at the local level.

Corruption at both the central and local government levels in Zimbabwe and elsewhere around the world often thrives when citizens and other stakeholders are denied their right to access information on how public resources are utilized. For instance, this research established that most local authorities face challenges or fail to produce financial reports and audited accounts. Access to information, such as revenue and expenditure, by citizens, is the most effective tool for reducing corruption by public officials at both national and subnational levels of government. In this era of digital technologies, e-government tools can enhance public administration and promote the standardization of transactions, thereby minimizing the discretionary use of powers and abuse of office by public officials. Ensuring the independence of the media is crucial, as it empowers citizens to make informed choices and report on poor service delivery and corrupt practices by those in public office.

7. Conclusions

The practical implementation of devolution could help tackle corruption in local authorities and improve the provision of human rights-related goods and services. However, addressing corruption at both the central and subnational levels of government is a complex task. There is a need for strong legal and capacitated institutional frameworks. The government must prioritize adequate budgetary support for anti-corruption institutions and ensure they are staffed with skilled personnel and supported with sufficient material resources to perform their duties effectively. Other corruption-related challenges that local authorities in Zimbabwe face include people with low incomes or non-submission of financial reports and audited accounts, as well as the non-disclosure of critical information to citizens. Addressing such problems requires concerted efforts to promote a culture of information sharing and implement measures that foster transparency and accountability.

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