SOFT SECURITY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
EASTERN DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Angelė Čepėnaitė¹, Sigita Kavaliūnaitė²

¹,²Mykolas Romeris University, Ateities g. 20 LT-08303 Vilnius, Lithuania
E-mails:¹ cepangele@gmail.com; ²sigita.kavaliunaite@urm.lt

Received 5 October 2012, accepted 6 December 2012

Abstract. Presented paper suggests an instrumental approach to soft security and aims to reveal capacity of soft security instruments in terms of contribution to both security and sustainable development in the region which is addressed by Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy and which includes Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Russian Federation (which is neither part of EaP nor among 16 EU partners addressed by the European Neighbourhood Policy) is also included in the overview as an important factor of influence in respect of regional security and relations between EaP states and EU. Referring to the main ideas of researchers and policy makers using different approaches to soft security as a phenomenon, the authors of the paper define soft security instruments as purposely organised social practices which rely mainly on sharing, congruence and development of values and competences of initiators and participants of security governance. Focus on the effectiveness of sharing, congruence and development of values and competences of initiators and participants of the EU policies and related joint projects as well as relevant combinations of soft instruments with economic and normative hard means is seen as a possibility to gradually increase level of regional security and transfer elements leading to sustainable development in this region.

Keywords: Security, soft security, sustainable development, Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy.


JEL Classifications: F5, F6, O1

1. Introduction

States and international organizations have developed different approaches in order to mitigate insecurity problems. A long-standing debate related to those approaches usually raises the issues of effectiveness of particular approach, complementarities of those approaches or, on the contrary, risks of circumscribing one another. The process of formulating and implementing European Union (EU) policies related to managing international risks and enhancing influence schemes in the EU neighbourhood requires constant identification and re-examination of routes and instruments for meeting challenges to peace and security. A permanently expanding spectrum of security risks, threats and factual disruptions resulted by globalisation which creates environment of increasing complexity and interoperability outside EU borders, as well as a number of unresolved conflicts, which emerged during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, demand innovative solutions and increased attention to regional security issues. Prevailing EU approach to regional security challenges on European level focuses on so-called “soft security”.

Findings, insights and statements of a number of re-
searchers as well as policy makers are used for analysis of soft security in this paper, e.g. Stańczyk (2011), Lankauskiene and Tvaronavičienė (2012). The view that “the current policies and security measures cannot guarantee effective counteraction against potential challenges and threats. Now we know that their character is diversified and non-military to a high degree. Therefore, the relevant responses require corresponding non-military measures” (Stańczyk 2011:8) is supported in this paper. Building on the insights related to the significance of security to sustainability for today’s globalized society as well as to common dimensions of security and sustainable development: “social, economic, environmental” (Lankauskiene and Tvaronavičienė 2012:28), this paper suggests a different angle of the approach to security: i.e. to differentiate security in terms of instruments used against risks and threats and to categorise them as “soft”, “economic” and “hard”.

Highlighting the role of soft security instruments which are defined as purposely organised social practices which focus and rely mainly on sharing, congruence and development of values and competences of those involved in the process of dealing with security issues, the paper briefly reviews existing EU policies and related project management related to EaP states and Russian Federation (which is neither part of EaP nor among 16 EU partners addressed by the European Neighbourhood Policy but is also included in the overview as an important factor of influence in respect of regional security and relations between EaP states and EU), suggesting to expand soft security component by further engaging selected participants from this region in the processes related to sharing, congruence and development of their competences which are necessary for effective dealing with insecurities on a larger scale, and thus to pave a way for extension of EU practices of sustainable development on regional level.

2. Scientific Perceptions of Soft Security

The concepts of security and power in international relations have a number of different aspects, since they reflect a number of closely interrelated phenomena and processes. For defining soft security as a component of external policy and joint project management, the following observations made by Buzan (1984) in respect of abstract concepts such as peace, power and security, are taken into account. “Con-cepts like peace, power and security lack precise, agreed definitions: they identify broad issues or conditions clearly enough to serve as important frameworks for discussion, but at the empirical level they cannot be, or have not yet been, reduced to standard formulas” (Buzan 1984:118). In addition, the “security perspective rejects the notion that the problem of insecurity can be solved. It tries instead to develop a management approach which is equally sensitive to both the national and the international dynamics of the insecurity problem” (Buzan 1984:112).

The tendency to look at soft security issues as a secondary avenue of international relations is affected by a dominating view on the level of “high politics” which, while dealing with security issues, usually focuses on hard security concept. The concept of “soft security” in political literature is associated by Becher (2001) and Lomagin (2001) with non-military dimension, a secondary role within the system of international relations and a common denominator featuring a very wide and pluralistic coverage of different issues. The latter feature poses a risk of losing practical value and proceeding within pluralistic trend. The following citation captures the main features singled out from the processes and phenomena that are usually attributed to soft security: “The term “soft security”, at the time of East-West detente, was originally used to distinguish military issues from other relevant security issues, including such military-related issues as confidence-building measures and arms control. The subsequent widening of the notion of security has added environmental themes, transnational risks and security challenges, plus a wide spectrum of economic, social and political factors that affect the prospects for enhanced security through “stability export” and transformation. “Soft security” is thus apparently about almost everything except defence proper. In this sense, it is not really a term of practical value” (Becher 2001:1). In addition, Becher (2001:1) points out: “A different distinction may be more significant: that between those issues that can be properly dealt with between governments; and those issues, often of a technical nature, that need also to be effectively addressed on a local and regional level across national borders. When I speak of soft security, I therefore mean those issues that involve mainly technical, organisational, administrative or informational interaction on the working level and are not in essence elements of the ‘high’ politics best addressed in formal diplomatic channels. In this
sense, the soft-security agenda opens up a decentralised secondary avenue for international cooperation that in certain circumstances is easier, although not necessarily simple, to pursue”. Similar approach is used by Lomagin (2001:1) in relation to soft security issues with non-military origin of threats: “Soft security threats are those of non-military origin. Hard security concerns are considered more important in Russia, to the extent that some members of the political elite do not even know what soft security threats are. Because of the region’s proximity, soft security problems in northwest Russia receive more attention from the EU than other issues, although these problems are in no way limited to this region”.

However, such tendency to regard soft security organisations as secondary players in the system of international relations has been questioned by a number of analysts. As Pop (2000:1) mentions, “subregional frameworks of cooperation were perceived, due to their “soft” security issue approach, as “the Cinderellas of European security”. However, throughout the last couple of years, there has been a growing awareness, both politically and institutionally, of the value of these groupings. Consequently, subregional arrangements have begun to gain their rightful place within the new evolving, institutionally comprehensive and complementary European security architecture”. Vrey (2005:1) points out: “Proponents of soft security strive to ensure the goal of individual security without resorting to armed coercion. Given the extended scope of security sectors falling within the ambit of soft security regional co-operation is indispensable – a phenomenon most visible in European security architecture and that of Northern Europe in particular. Not only European decision-makers, however, pursue the soft security option”. According to Lindley – French (2004), dividing lines between hard and soft, military and civil security are dissolving and more flexibility as well as new sets of relationships are required to cope with new problems and manage new complexities associated with security issues. This is partly attributed to comprehensive approach to security underlying the European Security Strategy, which, according to Bishop (2005), aims to integrate different dimensions of the EU’s external policies: the military, economic, political and social.

In order to work out an instrumental approach in respect of management of security risks and to define factors of effectiveness of soft security instruments, it is important to take into account observations and conclusions of analysts in respect of the EU security governance and increasing scope of its reliance on soft instruments. Those aspects are explored by Hegemann (2012); Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004); Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006); Trubek, D.M. and Trubek, L.G. (2007), Rhinard et al. (2007), Bosson (2011), Hix (1998), Kohler-Koch and Eising (1999), Caparini (2006), Webber et al. (2004), Krahmann (2003) and Chayes, A. and Chayes, A.H. (1995). Hegemann (2012:2) provides useful insights on the EU security governance and increasing scope of its reliance on soft instruments. His analysis highlights a shift towards informal arrangements. According to Hegemann (2012:2) “an ambiguous and multifaceted system of security governance has emerged that aims to reconcile the need for more integration with national prerogatives and sensitivities. This system leaves most formal competences to member states but incorporates a growing number of actors, issues, modes of cooperation, and compliance mechanisms that vary in their degree of formality and informality.”

The development of the concept of security governance is related to transnationalization of security risks (Kahl 2010) and the widening of the concept of security (Buzan et al.1998). “Security governance thus highlights the rise of increasingly transnational security risks emanating from non-state actors, the mounting importance of various public and private actors for the provision of security under these circumstances, and the proliferation of networked forms of coordination to facilitate flexible solutions among a growing bulk of national and international actors” (Hegemann 2012:4). Evolving modes of governance encompass public and private actors, rely on horizontal networks and soft instruments such as exchanging best practices and others (Hix 1998; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999). According to Hegemann (2012:5), “security governance can encompass informal and decentralized networks or formal integration and centralization”. In addition, “EU crisis management capacity is to a large extent ultimately relying on the willingness and ‘know-how’ of the multitude of European actors and levels to pool resources and assist each other” (Ekengren 2006: 91). Another important soft instrument which is being increasingly used in the framework of security gov-
ernance is peer reviews (Bossong 2011).

Hegemann (2012) points out both potentially positive and negative outcomes of the increasing scope of the EU security governance’s reliance on soft instruments. According to him, member states and EU institutions created new and more informal mechanisms that produce some results and to some extend can rely on funding and coordinative platforms. However, it is not known “much about the long-term impact of incremental exercises such as peer reviews or security research on the development of actual national policies and the EU’s comparative advantage remains fragile with a view to the much larger national budgets and institutional infrastructures. Eventually, the plethora of informal networks and projects might be a problem itself and spread more confusion than coordination and coherence” (Hegemann 2012:18).

Taking into account that security issues are a top priority for the EU when dealing with states addressed by Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy because of such security issues as a number of unresolved conflicts which lead to crime acceleration and complicate management of other security risks resulted by globalisation, it is considered within this paper that the process of the design and implementation of EU initiated policies and related projects is regarded by EU through the lenses of regional security. In this relation it is important to overview analysis of soft social instruments in a wider scope disregarding weather they are used as directly related to “soft security” or in association with to concepts of “soft power” or “soft law.”

3. Soft Social Instruments in Academic Discourse


Having overall understanding that security, defence and promotion of a desired order heavily depend in one way or another on the possession and use of power, scholars and politicians often differ in describing what is implied as “power”. Approach based on the understanding of power in international relations as military power operating on the basis of destruction/threats of destruction is frequently found in the literature on international relations. For example, Burton (1972:45) provides a statement that “Communications, and not power, are the main organising influence in world society.” However, descriptions of organizing, integrative or aggregative capability of social phenomenon to produce effects (desirable or as a side-effect) have led to indications of the existence of another kind of power of non-military (non-coercive) character, referred to as “civilian power” (Maull 1990; Smith 2000).

While some states often demonstrate preference of engagement in coercive (including military) power politics, others (like European Union) are keen to solve insecurity and international influence problems by paying more attention to construction of loose socio-economic networks and partnerships, operating on the basis of “positive conditionality”, using wide range of potential civilian instruments of conflict prevention, strengthening cooperation relations with other states and organisations, etc. Formation and implementation of different strategic policies and their combinations have gradually widened definition of power in international relations moving away from identification of power with military power. Boldvin (1979) has shown power’s dependence on the context in which the relationship exists and its interrelation with such characteristics as behaviour and motivation or possession of capabilities or resources that can influence desired outcomes. A number of studies (e.g. Mansbridge 1990, Vedrine and Moisi 2001) provide description of non-coercive motivation tools used by politicians. Through contrasting two models of power – domination and cooperation, Francis (2011) argues that the dominant concept of “power over” has led to a damaging militarism and suggests to focus on a “power with” using an “interdependence approach” (Francis 2011: 507) to life. Dichotomist approach to power and security is often detected in the broader context of “conflict transformation” concept introduced by Lederach in the 1980s when he began exploring “how do we transform those things that damage and tear apart human relationships to those that protect and build healthy communities” (Lederach 2010: 7). The conceptual framework of “conflict transformation” is oriented towards addressing the root causes of violent conflict and focuses on both structures and processes of interaction in protracted social conflicts. Conflict transformation is regarded as a complex process of changing a number of relationships, attitudes, interests, discourses and underlying structures
that encourage and condition violent political conflict. Reimann (2004: 6) mentions such non-coercive measures used in the framework of conflict management (including conflict transformation) as “facilitation, negotiation, mediation, fact-finding missions, “good offices”, consultation in the form of problem-solving, workshops and round tables, capacity building, trauma work, grassroots training, development and human rights work”. In his thesis “Power plays in a de facto state: Russian hard and soft power in Abkhazia”, Jonston (2011: 1) claims: “The conceptual divide between “hard power” and “soft power,” and the resources that constitute the basis of each, remain hotly debated topics among International Relations theorists as well as foreign policy advisors and analysts. Two developments in the last decade that have greatly influenced the study of the hard-power/soft-power dichotomy are: (1) the pursuit by many single-state actors of foreign policy strategies identifying and actively incorporating soft-power instruments, and (2) the realization by political theorists that individual policy instruments often exhibit unexpected hard and soft-power characteristics and effects, sometimes resulting in hard power acting soft and soft power acting hard”.

Concept of soft law within dichotomy of “hard/soft” also has been explored in the different branches of social sciences. Almost two decades ago, in the article “Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community”, Snyder (1999) noted that rules of conduct that may have no legally binding instruments/force can have practical effects for European integration. In relation to the debate over the relative value of hard and soft law, Buzan (2004) provides the argument “that soft and hard legalisations do not necessarily correlate with soft = bad/weak and hard = good/strong” (Buzan 2004:56, referring to Abbott and Snidal (2000). In the article “Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination”, Trubek, D.M. and Trubek, L.G. (2005) provide observations in respect of the relative value of hard and soft law in EU social policy “which should help us as we seek to move past dichotomous thinking and fully engage hybrid constellations. Once we understand the limits of approaches that stress one mode at the expense of the other, recognise that every judgement must be comparative and look at relative capacity for specific objectives in varied contexts, see that there are ways these approaches can be combined, and recognise that such combinations may be essential to accomplishing specific goals, we should be able to transcend the terms of the hard/soft debate. And in doing that we will find ourselves with a new and richer understanding of what we mean both by “law” and “European integration.” (Trubek and Trubek, 2005: 346). Consequently, the conceptual divide between hard and soft instruments which is used by some theorists for stressing necessity to transform social interactions, is questioned by others, who urge to transcend such divide and find innovative combinations for accomplishing desired goals in specific contexts.

3.2. Soft Power as a Power of Attraction in the Framework of Threefold Taxonomy

The concept of “soft power” was defined in the context of international relations theory as a specific kind of power differing from “hard power” and “economic power” by Joseph Nye and further developed in a systemic manner in by him in his study “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics” (Nye 2004). In his comprehensive analysis of the concept “soft power” as power of attraction which “often leads to acquiescence” (Nye 2004: 6), and its role in world politics, Nye describes in a detailed manner three types of power: (1) Military power which is associated with such kinds of behaviour as “coercion, deterrence, protection”, features such sources of motivation as “threats, force”, and is related with government policies using “coercive diplomacy, war, alliance”; (2) Economic power which is associated with “inducement, coercion”, features “payments, sanctions” as motivation sources and is related with government policies using “aid, bribes, sanctions”, and (3) Soft power which is associated with “attraction, agenda setting”, features “values, culture, policies, institutions” as sources of motivation and is related with government policies using “public diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy” (Nye 2004: 18). Thus the term of “soft power” and its definition coined by Nye during several past decades has widely spread in political discourse. Focusing on one of the main characteristics of soft power: “getting others to want the outcomes you want” (Nye 2004: 4), Nye defines soft power as a power of attraction, which “co-opts people rather than coerces them” and “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others” (Nye 2004: 4) and thus influences political outcomes. Soft power has high degree of independence and in some cases its direction of influence can
either coincide with governmental political goals and policy line or contradict/undermine them and even become a factor of deep changes in politics and social developments. According to Nye, if compared to two other kinds of power: military power and economic power, soft power works in different way – it engenders cooperation through “attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values” (Nye 2004: 7) and therefore soft power should be taken into account while formulating policies. Nye notes that “The soft power that is becoming more important in the information age is in part a social and economic by-product rather than solely a result of official government action” (Nye 2004: 32). Soft power can “work” selectively: “Attraction does not always determine others’ preferences, but this gap between power measured as resources and power judged as the outcomes of behaviour is not unique to soft power. It occurs with all forms of power” (Nye 2004: 6). Resources of soft power have different sources: “In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others” (Nye 2004: 8) and they depend significantly on governmental policies: “Government policies can reinforce or squander a country’s soft power” (Nye 2004: 14).

Similar approach based on threefold taxonomy in respect of power is used by Boulding (1989) who describes the nature of power as a social structure which can be described in three categories based on the consequences: destructive power, power of exchange and integrative power. According to Boulding (1989), one type of power may be predominant in some behaviours or organizations; however, generally the elements of each power are present. Threefold taxonomy approach is also used by Bonoma (1976) in description of interrelation between certain types of power-conflict dynamics. In this relation Bonoma (1976) outlines “three different prototypical power systems [...] : the unilateral power system, in which a strong source imposes influence on a weak target; the mixed power system, in which partially equivalent interactants bargain to agreement or deadlock; and the bilateral power system, in which interactants are in unit relation and formulate joint policy programs” (Bonna ma 1976: 499). Threefold taxonomy approach in used also by Wendt when he describes three kinds of macro-level systemic structures, “each based on the kind of roles that dominate the system” (Wendt 1999: 247): Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. They are based, respectively, on such property as states viewing each other as enemies, rivals or friends as a fundamental determinant. According to Buzan (2004: 222), “The triumph of European power meant not only that a sharp and apparently permanent rise in the level of interaction (and thus density and interdependence) took place, but also that Western norms and values and institutions dominated the whole system,” using a mixture of coercion, copying and persuasion. Underlying forces influencing systemic changes and continuations on international level and related to both: the mode of influence and durability of effects are described by Buzan (2004: 103), who integrates insights of Wendt (1999: 247–50), Kratochwil’s (1989: 97), Hurd (1999) and March and Olsen (1998: 948–54) in his version of threefold taxonomy of those underlying forces: coercion, calculation and belief.

Overview of concepts of soft instruments suggests an approach which is useful for further research: (1) soft social instruments could be better suited for some circumstances, hard instruments could be more beneficial for others, (2) there is a possibility to engage in constructing hybrid constellations for accomplishment of specific goals (3) the process of EU security governance and sustaining stability on European level by non-coercive means which are associated with soft law and soft power, and which rely on shared values, can be also attributed to and captured by the concept of soft security, (4) soft instruments in the context of security governance are regarded by analysts as (a) being in opposition to coercive (hard) instruments in the framework of transformation and conflict management, (b) being in interplay/interrelation/ interoperability with hard instruments, (c) being in interplay with coercive (hard) and economic instruments in the framework of influence enhancement.


The approach preferred by the European Union for security governance in its Neighbourhood is to proceed with European integration through legal harmonization, which translates into binding commitments by each EU Party to implement the acquis
One of the examples of joint projects based on such approach to regional security and stability is an initiative to create Energy Community as a response to the conflicts of the 1990s which, as it is stated in the website home page of Energy Community, “led to the disintegration of a unified energy system that stretched from the Adriatic to the Black and Aegean Seas” (Energy Community 2012 a: 1).

Transforming EU power in this case into desirable external socio-economic and socio-cultural changes through intertwining security and economic goals with cultural aspects within the process of designing policies and implementing joint projects has been positively evaluated by the European Commission: “Energy Community is about investments, economic development, security of energy supply and social stability; but – more than this – the Energy Community is also about solidarity, mutual trust and peace. The very existence of the Energy Community, only ten years after the end of the Balkan conflict, is a success in itself, as it stands as the first common institutional project undertaken by the non-European Union countries of South East Europe” (European Commission 2011: 2).

EU policy targeted at creation and supporting of the Energy Community resulted in binding commitments by non-EU member Parties to incorporate relevant EU-originated acquis communautaire: “By extending the internal market for network energy beyond the boundaries of the European Union, the Energy Community carries forward the success story of European integration. Just as the European Union’s, the approach taken by the Energy Community is one of legal harmonization, which translates into binding commitments by each Party to implement the acquis communautaire as set out in the provisions of the Treaty and the measures adopted by the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community” (Energy Community 2012 b: 7). However in those fields where EU neighbours are not willing to accept this approach the EU is initiating cooperative projects acquainting with EU style of governance, spreading best practices, monitoring social and economic processes, encourages proactive reforms and shared problem-solving in the economic and social field, relying mainly on soft instruments and economic measures in order to prevent appearance and escalation of conflicts. Competence of finding solutions for “best fit” of “best practices” in the context of security governance becomes one of the major factors of achieving desired outcomes. Thus, EU combines transformational approach highlighted in dichotomist analysis framework and combinatory approach reflected in the analysis within threefold taxonomy based on interaction and congruence of soft, normative hard (relying on multilaterally acceptable legislation) and economic instruments.

Understanding by EU policy makers of the features associated with soft security and soft power has been revealed by analysis (Kavaliūnaitė 2011) of EU documentation containing notions of “soft security” and “soft power” which has shown the variety of terms in numerous EU cultural – linguistic contexts and their broad scope of descriptions. There is an overall shared understanding that the concepts of “soft security” and “soft power” are associated with sets of certain non – military social practices. One set of those practices is regarded as international policy issues and external instability management targets embedding certain risks and threats, which are supposed to be counterbalanced by “soft measures”. Another is viewed as particular set of instruments for countervailing, minimizing and elimination of those risks and threats. Function of “soft” (security or power) related instruments of international policies and management is attributed to certain non-military forms and patterns of social practices which also are described as an extensive list of examples.

As far as the scientific perceptions and findings related to soft security that have been highlighted in the previous sections are concerned, the overview of the concepts “soft security” and “soft power” in EU legislation in the framework of discourses of politicians who design EU external policy has to some extend confirmed some of the earlier described features of soft security in terms of attributing soft security with particular social practices, expanded a list of social practices attributed to soft security, and questioned ability of soft security to function as effective tool of security governance. The aggregated list of features associated with soft security instruments includes such social practices of non-military character as confidence-building measures, arms control development, reconstruction, long-term peace building, training in relation to conflict prevention/peace-keeping, reconciliation process, humanitarian assistance, good governance, human rights, joint exercises, best practices exchange, capacity-building, mutual learning, security research, peer reviews, cre-
At the crossroads of coordination of local authorities and the private sector development, external assistance; European development NGOs’ initiatives, diplomacy, trade, development aid; EU enlargement; spreading EU norms and values such as human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, freedom of expression, respect for diversity and intercultural dialogue; facilitation, negotiation, mediation, fact-finding missions, “good offices”, consultation focused on problem-solving, workshops, round tables, trauma work, grassroots training, analysis, planning, training in relation to conflict prevention/peace-keeping, reconciliation process and humanitarian assistance, which are purposefully organised for addressing needs and concerns in respect of maintaining and increasing security on international level within increasingly complicated international environment: i.e. needs to mitigate environmental and nuclear hazards, drugs, arms, human trafficking, cross-border organised crime, the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation and global warming.

Summing up the main insights related to the features of soft instruments it can be concluded that it is possible to define soft security instruments as various purposefully organised social practices focussing and relying on sharing, congruence and development of values and competences of initiators and participants of the process of security governance. Effective functioning of soft security instruments depends on the level of competences of participants of security governance and the schemes of combination soft security instruments with economic (focussing and relying on providing or withholding economic values) and hard normative (in the framework of EU policies – legally binding multilateral arrangements, preferably on the basis of acquis communautaire, articulating, inter alia, boundaries beyond which the socially imposed punishments are applied) instruments.

The need to share and develop, as well as to increase a level of security related competences of professionals within new members (after 2004 and further enlargements) in both EU and/or NATO contexts in order to achieve coherence with competences and values with other members’ professionals within transatlantic community, a number of security competence related institutions or specific structures within existing institutions have been established. As one of the examples of such emergence of new institutions, a number of security oriented centres of excellence (COE) either independent of under umbrella of NATO (presenting soft dimension of this organisation) could be mentioned: Cooperative Cyber Defence (CCD) COE, Estonia; Energy Security (ENSEC) COE, Lithuania; Nuclear Security COE, Lithuania; Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) COE, Slovakia; Mountain Warfare (MW) COE, Slovenia; Human Intelligence (HUMINT) COE, Romania; BIPAI’s Romanian Clinical COE, Romania; Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear Defence (JCBRN Defence) COE, Czech Republic; Military Medical (MILMED) COE, Hungary; Crisis Management for Disaster Response (CMDR) COE, Bulgaria; Military Police (MP) COE, Poland. Lithuania and Romania stand out in this row as states having established two security issues oriented COEs each. Effective functioning of those centers would result in spill over of positive effects and elevating a level of professional response to regional security risks and threats.

Taking into account widening of the concept of sustainable development “from a near exclusive concern with the environmental predicament, to an integrated conception of environmental, economic and social determinants of the human future, in which the former is by no means dominant” (Vogler 2007: 430) and referring to sustainable development as “preventing of too much damage to the earth and to humans for contemporary and future generations” (De Tombe 2006: 69) it can be indicated that enhanced EU approach to regional security is closely related to the process captured by the concept “sustainable development”. Through establishment of a social interactive process based on shared values in the spirit of acquis communautaire for joint regional security gain, the EU is simultaneously transferring some elements of governance which have been developed by the EU institutions with focus on sustainable development determinants.


Soft security instruments are used in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and related projects for implementation of this EU initiative and function as a component of the process of joint management of those projects.
Taking into account theoretical insights provided by Buzan (2004) in respect of types of interstate society, as well as his interpretation of the concepts of “pluralism and “solidarism”, as assumptions for an overview of EU policies in respect of the region of concern, the following logics for separating two modes of EU approaches: (1) proactive: transformational or enhanced approach and (2) reactive: preventive or limited approach to regional security is suggested:

The EU has reached the development stage featured in higher or lower degree by cooperative, convergence and confederative types presenting thick layer of institutions, norms and shared liberal values that constitute comparatively high level of solidarism which ensures comparatively high level of stability and security. The regional security dimension of its external policies is focused on neighbouring states that feature coexistence and partly cooperative (mainly its pluralist side) types of interstate society presenting thinner layer institutions and norms with weak or without sufficient adherence to shared liberal values. From the point of view of the EU politicians, the latter is seen as more vulnerable to changes of circumstance and less stable than international society of the EU itself. As a long-term solution for enhancing regional security and stability within its neighbouring states a number of sets of various EU external policies and joint projects are used to encourage and assist those states to gradually transform their social and economic relationships in a variety of ways: innovative, imitative, continuative or restorative (Šaulauskas 2000) as well as (in the long run) their socio-cultural contexts and collective identities enabling movement towards convergence type based on shared liberal values in the spirit of *acquis communautaire* since this model is seen as an advanced option in stability, security and economic terms, as it has been proved by EU historic development since its interception. Trying to avoid unnecessary confrontation, the EU, according to this logics, should be keen to rely mainly on non-coercive means featuring attractiveness of the projects’ offer suggested to the EU partner state(s) leading to establishment of a social interactive process of the pursue of joint regional security gain. The coercive instruments (mainly in the form of conditionality and binding legislation) are seen as means playing complimentary role and introduced on the basis of mutual consent.

EU initiative illustrating above mentioned logics is Eastern Partnership within European Neighbourhood Policy which is described in the following way: “What happens in the countries in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus affects the European Union. Successive EU enlargements have brought these countries closer to the EU and their security, stability and prosperity increasingly impact on the EU’s. The potential these countries offer for diversifying the EU’s energy supplies is one example. All these countries, to varying degrees, are carrying out political, social and economic reforms, and have stated their wish to come closer to the EU. The conflict in Georgia in August 2008 confirmed how vulnerable they can be, and how the EU’s security begins outside our borders. The European Commission put forward concrete ideas for enhancing our relationship with: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. This would imply new association agreements including deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with those countries willing and able to enter into a deeper engagement and gradual integration in the EU economy. It would also allow for easier travel to the EU through gradual visa liberalisation, accompanied by measures to tackle illegal immigration. The Partnership will also promote democracy and good governance, strengthen energy security, promote sector reform and environment protection, encourage people to people contacts, support economic and social development and offer additional funding for projects to reduce socio-economic imbalances and increase stability” (European External Action Service 2012).

The objective of the ENP which was developed in 2004 is “to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation. [...] The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development” (European Commission 2004: 3). Regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as security governance instruments the “EU
and partner countries should also work together on effective multilateralism, so as to reinforce global governance, strengthen coordination in combating security threats and address related development issues. Improved co-ordination within the established political dialogue formats should be explored, as well as the possible involvement of partner countries in aspects of CFSP and ESDP, conflict prevention, crisis management, the exchange of information, joint training and exercises and possible participation in EU-led crisis management operations. Another important priority will be the further development of a shared responsibility between the EU and partners for security and stability in the neighbourhood region” (European Commission 2004: 13). The ENP’s initially bilateral format was further enriched with regional and multilateral co-operation initiatives, the EaP being one of them.

According to European Commission, the “EU and Russia have decided to develop their strategic partnership through the creation of four common spaces as agreed at the St Petersburg Summit in May 2003. Russia and the enlarged European Union form part of each other’s neighbourhood. It is in our common interest to draw on elements of the ENP to enrich work on the common spaces, notably in the areas of cross-border and sub-regional co-operation. The EU and Russia need to work together, as neighbours, on common concerns” (European Commission 2004: 6). The long term four “common spaces” were created in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and on the basis of common values and shared interests. These cover the following issues: (1) Common Economic Space, covering economic issues and the environment; (2) Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; (3) Common Space of External Security, including crisis management and non-proliferation; (4) Common Space of Research and Education, including cultural aspects.

In addition, the EaP states are engaged in a number of other EU initiatives. Though current European Security and Defence Policy aims to strengthen the EU’s external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities, within Eastern Dimension military capabilities have not been applied directly. Two joint projects in the form of civilian missions in Moldova/ Ukraine (The EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, started in 2005) and Georgia (The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, started in 2008) are being carried out in this policy context (European External Action Service 2011). The first mission focuses on prevention of smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud by the job training and advice by professionals of border management services in EU Member States to Moldovan and Ukrainian officials providing EU support for capacity building for border management, including customs, on the Moldova-Ukraine border. The second is an unarmed and non-executive civilian ceasefire (after 2008 South Ossetia war) EU monitoring mission for stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building, as well as reporting to the EU in order to inform European policy-making and thus contribute to the future EU engagement in the region. In addition, Moldova and Ukraine are members of Energy Community, while Georgia has an observer status in this organisation.

Another important direction of using soft security instruments is a broadened and deepened scope of EU participation in political forums for regional intergovernmental cooperation such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe and others. However, existing socio-cultural barriers and national prerogatives result in higher or lower levels of motivation to engage in the cooperative projects suggested by the EU. As Sergunin (2010) points out, “Although Russia has embraced a growing number of cooperative projects with the EU, there have also been some limitations restricting both Russia’s engagement and the success of different projects. These include residual mistrust and prejudice, bureaucratic resistance in both Brussels and Moscow, authoritarian trends in Russia’s domestic policies, uneasy relations between “old” and “new” EU members, conflicting interests in the post-Soviet space and (as mentioned) the lack of an updated and revised Partnership & Cooperation Agreement”. Moscow reacted, according to Sergunin (2010) “to the EaP with both caution and scepticism, because the Russian leadership was not sure about its real goals: is the EU serious about making its new neighbourhood a stable and safe place or is it some kind of geopolitical drive to undermine Russia’s positions in the area? Moscow is particularly sensitive about the EaP programme because Russia has fundamental interests in the region that range from strategic and political (confederation with Belarus, military-technical cooperation with Belarus and Armenia, military conflict with Georgia, support
of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to economic (investments, trade, energy supply, etc.) issues. It seems that the lack of a sound Russian strategy towards the EaP is one of the sources of misunderstanding in EU-Russia bilateral cooperation, a misunderstanding that sometimes contributes to derailing the Brussels-Moscow dialogue. As a result of this, both EU and Russian policies often give the impression of muddling on rather than a sound and forward-looking strategy”.

As a result of various overviewed above EU initiated policies and related projects which are each other complementing and reinforcing within EU and Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy related states the two emerging subsystems can be differentiated: integration subsystem between the EU and those states which are more open to EU initiatives and its transformational approach, and subsystem with those states that are reserved (e.g. RF and Belarus) in respect of EU strategies. The sub system which is developing on the basis of EU enhanced transformational approach has prospects of gradually turning into quasi organisation suitable for application of insights and methods developed by governance and organizational theories focussing on competence enhancement, such as Responsive/Good Governance concept (OECD 2005; United Nations 2005), strategic approach to Human Resource Development developed and promoted by Garavan et al. (1999), Buyens et al. (2001), Hockey et al. (2005), Luoma (2000), Šiugždiniénė (2008) and others, and Organizational Theory (Schout 2009) with focus on organizational learning processes and change through the establishment of a learning organization. This gradual formation of such quasi organisation includes most open and expressing interest in deeper European integration states: Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. Additional privileges for participants from those countries in regional security governance, focused on competence development using different formats, could lead to higher level of regional security as precondition for sustainable development. They could include: privileged access of particular EU partner’s citizens to educational programmes and training schemes focusing on EU studies and regional security issues (e.g. energy security, social stability and others) combined with acquiring project management, team building skills as well as qualities of effective teamwork; privilege of participation in the joint projects for graduates from men-tioned above educational programmes; privilege of participation in the joint policy making frameworks featuring possible extension of some of EU inherent modern forms of security governance, and others.

Conclusions

Suggested instrumental approach to soft security based on defining soft security instruments as sets of various purposefully organised social practices focusing and relying on sharing, congruence and development of values and competences of regional security governance initiators and participants revealed capacity of soft security instruments to contribute to both regional security and sustainable development as well as to foster the European integration in EU neighbourhood. Raising effectiveness of soft security instruments in the process of joint project management in the region of concern would imply considering special treatment of most open and expressing interest in deeper integration with the EU states addressed by Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy and proposing them a number of privileges for their representatives in the form of opportunities to develop their security governance related competences through participation in specific educational programmes and training schemes, EU initiated joint cooperative project management and relevant joint security policy formation on gradually expanding scale.

References


Burton, J.W. 1972. World Society. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
Angelė Čepėnaitė, Sigita Kavaliūnaitė
Soft Security for Sustainable Development: Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy


